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THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE-PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE:
A TWENTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE
Faust F. Rossi*
The Federal Rules of Evidence (Rules) have reached adulthood;
their twentieth anniversary has arrived. Two decades of national ex-
perience are sufficient to assess their impact on the law of evidence.
Now is a good time to ask: What has changed?
There have been many doctrinal modifications in evidence since
Congress enacted the Rules in 1975. But our concern is with major
transformations. What impact have the rules had? Everyone will
have a unique view of what developments have been most significant.
In this brief, descriptive Essay, I discuss three that strike me as major
transformations.
The first is the striking success of the national codification move-
ment. The Rules have created order out of the disarray that once
ruled the landscape. They have given us a reasonably uniform na-
tional law of evidence applicable in both state and federal courts. This
evolution, together with its beneficial by-products, represents a stun-
ning achievement.
A second transformation is the greatly enhanced admissibility of
expert testimony-an expansion made possible by provisions that
have eliminated preexisting common-law restrictions. This rule-
driven broadening of the permissible scope, basis, and form of expert
testimony has provoked controversy. There are recent signs of re-
trenchment. Some say the Rules have lowered the barriers too far
and call for greater protection against unreliable expertise.'
Finally, a revolution of sorts is underway in the area of hearsay.
The residual or catchall changes in Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) pro-
vide an open invitation to admit hearsay that fits none of the tradi-
* Professor of Law and Samuel S. Leibowitz Professor of Trial Techniques, Cornell
Law School. B.A., 1953, University of Toronto; LL.B., 1960, Cornell University. An ear-
lier version of this Essay was presented at the Evidence Section Program, Association of
American Law Schools Annual Meeting, New Orleans, Louisiana, January 7, 1995.
1. E.g., Charles R. Richey, Proposals to Eliminate the Prejudicial Effect of the Use of
the Word "Expert" Under the Federal Rules Evidence in Civil and Criminal Jury Trials, 154
F.R.D. 537 (1994).
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tional categorical exceptions.2 Courts have used the residuals
aggressively and often. The pattern of decisions reveals a gradual but
serious erosion of the rule against hearsay. I consider each of these
developments in turn.
The consensus is that the Rules, overall, have been successful. It
would be hard to find a knowledgeable commentator, judge, or lawyer
who now would say about the Rules: "better if you had never been
born.' 3 This perception of success is founded on one overriding
achievement: By providing an easily accessible, compact body of evi-
dence principles, the Rules have given us substantial uniformity in
federal courts and beyond. As a consequence, clarity and predictabil-
ity have been enhanced.
The blessings that flow from evidence codification are many.
Clarity and accessibility minimize judicial error and enhance the pre-
dictability that is so essential to the trial lawyer. Disparity of rulings
among individual judges is diminished. Evidence is less likely to be
simply "whatever the judge says it is." In addition, the Rules have had
enormous instructional value. Their existence has stimulated debate
among judges, lawyers, and scholars in conferences, workshops, and
classrooms.
That is not to say, of course, that there are no problems. The
Rules are certainly not beyond criticism. For one thing, the Rules are
not very adventuresome. One of the reasons for their acceptance and
influence is that they do not try to do too much. As drafted and modi-
fied by Congress, the Rules mostly represent current mainstream
opinion in evidence law. Those who regard codification as an oppor-
tunity for substantial reform were disappointed with the final product.
Innovations, at least those intended as such, are few. Perhaps that is
for the best. The drafters' infrequent excursions into the unconven-
tional have proven unwise. Dramatic changes in privileges led Con-
2. FED. R. EvD. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
3. One exception might be Congress itself. In 1975, if Congress could have foreseen
decisions overturning common-law precedents such as Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S.
171, 181 (1987) (overturning common-law rule that co-conspirator's statement is admissi-
ble only if the conspiracy is established by evidence independent of the statement), and
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988) (overturning common-law rule
prohibiting introduction of similar-act evidence unless trial court finds by preponderance
of evidence that defendant committed act), and could have foretold the amount and kind
of hearsay that would be admitted under the residual exception, who knows? Perhaps we
would have no federal rules to discuss. In fairness, however, that kind of hindsight would
likely doom many pieces of legislation.
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gress to completely expunge them. 4 Treating party admissions as
nonhearsay rather than as traditional exceptions is wrong and has
been roundly condemned.5 Leaving privileges to federal common-law
development is an enormous gap for an evidence code that seeks uni-
formity and clarity.
In addition there are, as one might expect, sins of omission, un-
necessary ambiguity, and bad drafting. Rule 407 codifies the well-
established prohibition against the use of "subsequent remedial meas-
ures" to prove "negligence or culpable conduct."16 But does the ban
apply to actions based on "strict liability?"' 7 Does Rule 407 cover a
remedial measure taken before the accident but after manufacture of
the product?8 Does the Rule apply to remedial measures required by
law?9 The exceptions to the Rule raise other questions: When is fea-
sibility controverted and how is feasibility defined?1" Should federal
4. Congress gutted the Supreme Court's proposed privilege rules by entirely deleting
nine specific privileges and three general rules. S. Rm,. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7058. These were replaced by Rule 501,
which provides that the law of privileges shall be developed by the federal courts as gov-
erned by common-law principles, except in civil actions in which state law supplies the rule
of decision with respect to which the state law of privileges shall govern. Id.
5. CHmRSTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAMiD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE
RtnEs: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 183-89 (1988); Freda F. Bein, Parties' Admissions,
Agents' Admissions: Hearsay Wolves in Sheep's Clothing, 12 HOFSRA L. REv. 393 (1984).
6. FED. R. EviD. 407.
7. Compare Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding rule
excluding evidence of remedial measures applies in products liability cases) with Huffman
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 908 F.2d 1470 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding evidence of remedial
measures admissible in strict products liability cases).
8. Compare Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1992) (excluding evi-
dence of alteration of forklift after manufacture but before accident) and Petree v. Victor
Fluid Power, Inc., 831 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1987) (reversing lower court's admission of evi-
dence of label attached to hydraulic press after sale but before accident) with Cates v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 928 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding remedial measures taken after
purchase but before accident admissible) and Chase v. General Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 17
(4th Cir. 1988) ("The change... occurred ... after the plaintiffs' car was manufactured and
sold to them. That was a 'measure' which was 'taken' before the 'event' mentioned in Rule
407. So Rule 407 does not exclude evidence with respect to that change." (quoting FED. R.
EVID. 407)).
9. Compare Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding FDA regula-
tions for product warnings inadmissible to prove negligence in prior version of warning)
with O'Dell v. Hercules, 904 F.2d 1194 (8th Cir. 1990) (listing of site on National Priorities
List did not constitute remedial action and therefore inadmissible) and Kociemba v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 683 F. Supp. 1579 (D. Minn. 1988) (holding evidence of remedial action
mandated by law inadmissible).
10. Compare Meller v. Heil Co., 745 F.2d 1297 (10th Cir.) (holding subsequent installa-
tion of security devices admissible to show devices are feasible), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1206
(1984) and Anderson v. Malloy, 700 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1983) (stating "feasibility" is al-
most always in controversy and means successful in its intended performance) with Mid-
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or state law govern this policy-based quasi-privilege?" On these
questions, the Rules give no help, and as a result, the circuits and
states are split. As one academic cleverly put it: "This is the kind of
'uniform' law that makes anarchy look good."' 2
Until the decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., we had to live for almost twenty years with the question of
whether the Frye "general acceptance"' 4 standard for novel scientific
evidence was dead or alive. And we had to live for fifteen years with
Congress' unhappy draft of Rule 609(a) relating to prior conviction
impeachment which left unclear its applicability in civil cases until it
was finally amended.'
It has been correctly noted that two circumstances magnified
omissions, ambiguities, and drafting errors.' 6 One was the absence of
an Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence to monitor
the need for amendments and to respond quickly to correct obvious
defects.' 7 Such a committee has now been established. 8 The other
circumstance was the Supreme Court's application of "plain meaning"
jurisprudence to the Rules.' 9 Under this standard the literal language
of the Rules controls, even in the face of arguably contrary policy,
precedent, or legislative history.20 As pointed out by Judge Becker
and Professor Orenstein, the result has been to overturn established
common-law consensus in situations where Congress, in all likelihood,
dleton v. Harris Press and Shear, Inc., 796 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating feasibility
means only "physically possible").
11. Compare Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1988) (state law
applied) and Moe v. Avions Mareel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917 (10th Cir.)
(state law applied), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 853 (1984) with Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970
F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1992) (federal law applied) and Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d
463 (7th Cir. 1984) (federal law applied).
12. Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., State Adaptation of the Federal Rules: The Pros and
Cons, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 293, 304 (1990).
13. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
14. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by FED. R.
EvrD. 702, construed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786
(1993).
15. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
16. Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen
Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee
on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEo.
WAsH. L. REv. 857, 858 (1992).
17. Id. at 860-62.
18. STEVEN A. SALTZBERG ET AL., 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 6 (6th
ed. 1994).
19. Becker & Orenstein, supra note 16, at 864.
20. d at 864 n.22.
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did not intend to deviate from established and well-reasoned prece-
dent.21 Right or wrong, the Supreme Court's literalist approach
greatly magnifies the consequences of drafting errors and the need for
rule amendments.22
At worst we can say that the Rules as drafted, interpreted, and
implemented have sometimes failed to give us the clear, uniform, and
correct result. But fairness requires us to compare what the Rules
have given us to what we had before. Overall they have filled an
enormous need by providing, in most cases, a reasonably clear, com-
pact, accessible code that has earned nationwide acceptance.
In particular, the impact of the Rules on state evidence law de-
serves tribute. The Rules changed the landscape. Thirty-seven states
now have evidence codifications based on the Rules.23 Even the few
recalcitrant states that resist codification-like Illinois, Massachusetts,
and New York-are slowly moving by court decision toward piece-
meal adoption of the Rules. In short the codification movement has
swept across our country. Since most litigation occurs in state courts,
this is a huge accomplishment.
Twenty years ago the evidence law of many individual states,
much more so than on the federal side, resided in a confusing "rag
bag" of scattered statutes and cases-including some very old cases
and some very old statutes. The result was that it was often hard to
find the law on a given issue. Even more disturbing was the fact that
on some surprisingly basic points of evidence, the law was uncertain.
That is true today in the few remaining jurisdictions without modern
codes.
For example, if one were to ask in New York-which is without a
codification-whether a prior inconsistent statement used to impeach
can be admitted substantively for its truth, a clear answer would be
impossible. The response would have to be something like: "Proba-
21. Id at 858.
22. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed
Rules of Evidence, 68 TEx. L. Rav. 745, 786 (1990); Glen Weissenberger, The Supreme
Court and the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 OHIo ST. L.J. 1307, 1330-
32 (1992).
23. By 1994 35 states had adopted codes based on the federal model: Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Louisi-
ana, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Ver-
mont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Washington, and Wyoming.
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAmD C. KIRKPATRICK, MODERN EVIDENCE § 1.2, at 4 n.2
(1995). Since 1994 Indiana and Maryland also have adopted codes based on the federal
model. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 101 to 1101; MD. REGS. CODE tit. 5, §§ 5-101 to 5-1008.
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bly not, but there was this 1968 decision by the highest court of the
state which suggests a yes answer, but since then the lower courts have
ignored it."'24 If one were to ask in Georgia-another state without a
federal based code-whether a witness on the stand may offer his own
prior out-of-court statement for its truth, or whether that would be
hearsay, the answer would also be unclear.25
Moreover, in precodification times, a surprising number of states
had antiquated, bizarre rules of evidence that sophisticated national
practitioners simply would not believe. Until its law was codified,
North Carolina, for example, allowed certain prior convictions to im-
peach. But one had to take the answer of the witness. If the target
witness denied being convicted, the court could not receive extrinsic
evidence.in the form of the certificate of conviction.26 In addition, it
used to be the rule in several states that a photograph could not, as
they say, speak for itself. A witness had to have seen and must testify
to what the photograph revealed. It could not be independent evi-
dence: an old doctrine that the courts had never reexamined until the
advent of codification.27
So, now, for many states, new evidence codes based on the Rules
have created order out of the disarray, have cleared up confusion on
basic principles, and have prompted reexamination and moderniza-
tion. This has been an enormous benefit to state courts and state
litigants.
Why do some states resist the trend to uniformity? Lawyers used
to the old ways tend to say things like "We got along without a code
for 200 years, why do we need one now?" Or to paraphrase again one
of our witty colleagues, "Why sacrifice superiority for uniformity?"28
To be fair, there is more to it than that. Codifications like the
Rules, in keeping with modem trends, tend to facilitate admissibility.
The more expert testimony admitted, the more hearsay comes in.
More admissible evidence is good if you represent clients who have
24. Compare Vincent v. Thompson, 377 N.Y.S.2d 118 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (holding
collateral estoppel did not apply to earlier New York Supreme Court decision) and Leten-
dre v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 236 N.E.2d 467 (N.Y. 1968) (stating prior inconsis-
tent statements are admissible for their truth) with People v. Raja, 433 N.Y.S.2d 200 (Sup.
Ct. 1980) (stating prior inconsistent statements are admissible only to impeach).
25. See GA. CODE ANN. § 38-301(a) (1990) (defining hearsay as evidence "which does
not derive its value solely from the credit of the witness but rests mainly on the veracity
and competency of other persons").
26. See, e.g., State v. King, 30 S.E.2d 230 (N.C. 1944).
27. See, e.g., Pearson v. State, 31 A.2d 624 (Md. 1943); State v. Gardner, 46 S.E.2d 824
(N.C. 1948).
28. Graham, supra note 12, at 301.
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the burden of proof; not so good if you represent defendants whose
preference is to keep evidence out. That explains, I suppose, why
most of the opposition to codification in recalcitrant states like New
York, Illinois, and Massachusetts comes from an unusual alliance of
lawyers who represent corporate defendants-insurance companies,
product manufacturers, and the criminal defense bar.2 9
In addition, in states like New York and several others, the legis-
lature controls the codification and the amendment process. Given
the popularity with voters of "tough on crime" issues, criminal defense
lawyers fear the politization of evidence law. They trust judges more
than legislators0
Aside from the growth of evidence codification, there has been a
second major alteration in the evidentiary landscape. One of the most
significant developments has been the acceptance accorded expert
opinion under the Rules. Expanded admissibility was intended and
has been accomplished. Evidence Rules 702 through 705 toppled
longstanding doctrinal barriers. As a result, a trial lawyer's options in
selecting and using expertise have increased manyfold.
Changes favoring admissibility have occurred at three levels.
First, Rule 702 liberalizes the test for what constitutes an appropriate
subject matter for expert opinion.3 ' It allows the admission of any
expert testimony that "will assist the trier of fact."' 32 It substitutes a
"helpfulness" test for the more conservative common-law require-
ment that the subject matter must be beyond the comprehension of
the jury. And, as the Supreme Court has now told us in its 1993 deci-
sion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 33 the language
of Rule 702 supersedes the restrictive Frye standard that used to re-
quire a "generally accepted" foundation for scientific evidence.34
Second, Rule 703 expanded the permissible bases for expert testi-
mony.35 No longer is it required that facts underlying the opinion be
in evidence. It is enough if the underlying facts, even if themselves
29. Barbara C. Salken, To Codify or Not to Codify-That Is the Question: A Study of
New York's Efforts to Enact an Evidence Code, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 641, 663 (1992) ("The
opposition [to codification] is mainly the criminal defense bar joined by civil lawyers who
generally represent defendants.").
30. Id at 697 ("The criminal defense bar's fear that the law of evidence will become
hostage to public opinion is the most pervasive and in some ways persuasive argument
against codification.").
31. FED. R. Evn,. 702.
32. Id
33. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
34. Id. at 2799.
35. FED. R. EvrD. 703.
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inadmissible, are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in making professional out-of-court decisions.36
Finally, Rules 70437 and 70538 have eliminated some traditional
foundation formalities restricting the manner of presenting expertise.
The former permits testimony on the ultimate issue.39 The latter elim-
inates the need for the hypothetical question and permits the expert to
give an opinion without first testifying to the underlying facts which
support it.
40
The result has been a presumption in favor of expert testimony.
This liberality is in the tradition of evidence reform. It reflects greater
confidence in the modem jury and its ability to see through the charla-
tan. It assumes the effectiveness of the adversary system-of cross-
examination and of opposing testimony-to control and discredit the
unreliable expert.
The rules and the decisions implementing them have been so suc-
cessful in admitting claimed expertise that some have begun to warn
against the danger of abuse. Only within the last several years have
courts started to retreat from the expansive welcome given to experts,
especially in the area of novel scientific evidence.
In Daubert, for example, the Supreme Court announced that trial
judges must ensure, as a condition to admissibility, that any and all
scientific evidence is reliable.4' This entails a judicial assessment of
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the expert opinion
is scientifically valid.42
It has been said that the history of procedural reform is the his-
tory of undoing the undesirable by-products of a prior reform. Per-
haps that is the case here. By requiring judges to be active
gatekeepers in screening out speculative expertise, Daubert may be
signalling a gradual end to the expansive admissibility of expert testi-
mony that has characterized the last two decades.
36. If an expert bases his opinion on facts and data "of a type reasonably relied upon
by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the
facts or data need not be admissible in evidence." d
37. FED. R. Evn. 704.
38. FED. R. EviD. 705.
39. "Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not ob-
jectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." FED.
R. EVID. 704.
40. An "expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons there-
for without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires other-
wise." FED. R. EVID. 705.
41. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
42. Id
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There has been yet another fundamental change in evidence law
under the Federal Rules. It involves the use of the so-called residual
or catchall clauses-Rules 803(24)43 and 804(b)(5)aa-_to admit a sur-
prising amount of hearsay. The result has been a gradual but notable
reworking of the rule against hearsay-a development clearly not in-
tended by Congress.
Congress enacted Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), only reluctantly,
to provide flexibility in rare instances when highly reliable and neces-
sary hearsay could not fit within the precise confines of a specified
categorical exception.45 Congress envisioned a limited role for the
residuals, intending to keep the hearsay exclusion intact and operating
along traditional lines.46 Thus, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
announced its view that "the residual exceptions will be used very
rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances."'47
This admonition has been mocked by the courts. Rules 803(24)
and 804(b)(5) give federal trial judges the discretion to admit hearsay
statements which fail to meet the requirements of any of the itemized
class exceptions. They have not been shy about using this power.
What is happening is that courts are admitting categories of hearsay
for which Congress explicitly failed to provide an exception, a trend
that has been well documented.
48
We have many examples. Congress limited the substantive ad-
missibility of unsworn prior inconsistent statements in Rule
801(d)(1)(A).49 It provides that such statements are admissible only
to impeach credibility, not for their truth. But they can and often do
43. FED. R. EVID. 803(24).
44. FED. R. EvrD. 804(b)(5).
45. S. REP. No. 1277, supra note 4, at 19, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7065.
46. "The committee does not intend to establish a broad license for trial judges to
admit hearsay statements that do not fall within one of the other exceptions.. . . The
residual exceptions are not meant to authorize major judicial revisions of the hearsay rule,
including its present exceptions." Id. at 20, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7066.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Randolph N. Jonakait, The Subversion of the Hearsay Rule: The Residual
Hearsay Exceptions, Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness, and Grand Jury Testi-
mony, 36 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 431 (1986); Myrna S. Raeder, The Effect of the Catchalls
on Criminal Defendants: Little Red Riding Hood Meets the Hearsay Wolf and Is Devoured,
25 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 925 (1992); Faust F. Rossi, The Silent Revolution, LrmG., Winter
1983, at 13; Glen Weissenberger, The Admissibility of Grand Jury Transcripts: Avoiding the
Constitutional Issue, 59 TuL. L. REv. 335 (1984).
49. FED. R. Ev. 801(d)(1)(A).
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find their way in for their truth under Rule 803(24). 50 Congress lim-
ited the substantive admissibility of prior consistent statements to
those offered to rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper mo-
tive. 1 But those that do not so qualify can be admitted under Rule
803(24).52 Former testimony of an unavailable declarant is admissible
under 804(b)(1) 53 only if the party against whom it is offered or that
party's predecessor had the opportunity to cross-examine with a simi-
lar motive. What if one of these conditions is missing? The decisions
tell us that it might still be admitted under Rule 804(b)(5). 4
The fundamental nature of the change becomes obvious if we
consider use of the grand jury testimony of an unavailable witness.
Can such testimony be admitted against the accused in a criminal
case? Before enactment of the Federal Rules in 1975, no court would
seriously consider receiving such evidence. Today, its admissibility
under the residual exceptions is a commonplace occurrence.55
Admission of this category of evidence is particularly startling
since, as a general matter, it is difficult to find special guarantees of
trustworthiness in grand jury statements. The grand jury is an ex
parte proceeding largely under the control of the prosecutor. Wit-
nesses appearing in this closed setting may feel pressured to testify.
They frequently respond to leading questions, and there is no oppor-
tunity for cross-examination. Except for the fact that it is under oath,
a grand jury statement usually has no special reliability. Congress
made no provision for this kind of evidence. Given its importance,
this category as a possible fixed hearsay exception could not have
been overlooked. The truth is that Congress would never have
imagined that this kind of testimony would be received against the
accused in a criminal case.
50. See, eg., United States v. Valdez-Soto, 31 F.3d 1467, 1469-73 (9th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 284,288-89 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Leslie, 542
F.2d 285, 289-91 (5th Cir. 1976).
51. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
52. United States v. Iaconetti, 540 F.2d 574,577-78 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1041 (1977).
53. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
54. United States v. Deeb, 13 F.3d 1532, 1536-37 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 1093 (1995).
55. United States v. Marchini, 797 F.2d 759, 764 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1085 (1987); United States v. Thomas, 705 F.2d 709,711-12 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
890 (1983); United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586,589 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1016 (1982); see also S. REP. No. 1277, supra note 4, at 19-20, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7066 (discussing scope of Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5)).
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Perhaps this erosion of hearsay would have happened even with-
out the Rules, but I doubt it. It grows almost entirely out of the grant
of discretion provided by the residual exceptions.
Congress' attempt to limit this discretion by listing requirements
in the catchalls has, for the most part, failed. The materiality and in-
terest of justice tests are too vague to have any meaning. The absolute
pretrial notice criteria often is rejected as impractical. The "more pro-
bative" requirement has been equated to a test of simple relevance
and the "equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness standard" has been
quite liberally construed.
What does the future hold for the Rules? We can expect, I think,
much greater rule-making activity. The last twenty years have pro-
duced only a handful of substantive amendments. Omissions, ambigu-
ities, and poor draftsmanship in the Rules have been largely left for
the courts to work out. Now, however, there is a newly created distin-
guished Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence with
responsibility for monitoring federal evidence. The buildup of twenty
years of scholarship analyzing the Rules constitutes a ready agenda
for change. We can expect it.
June 1995] 1281
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